Systematic Citizenship Forgery in Libya

1. Executive Analytical Summary

This report presents a structured analytical consolidation of 53 official publications released by the Office of the Attorney General of Libya between December 2024 and February 2026. The publications document citizenship forgery cases across multiple Libyan jurisdictions.

The confirmed quantitative parameters derived from these publications are as follows:

These parameters indicate structural exposure within Libya's civil registry system that extends beyond isolated criminal acts. The documented cases involve coordinated networks comprising institutional insiders, technical specialists, and external actors. The international mobility consequences are documented and measurable — the Libyan passport ranks 93rd globally on the Henley Passport Index, the lowest in North Africa.

2. Methodology and Data Integrity Parameters

The analytical framework employs a structured consolidation methodology applied to official prosecutorial disclosures. The primary data source consists of 53 publications from the Office of the Attorney General of Libya, released through the institution's verified social media channels.

3. Legal Framework: Law No. 24 of 2010

Libya's nationality framework is governed by Law No. 24 of 2010 on the Provisions of Libyan Nationality. Key provisions include:

4. Confirmed Quantitative Metrics

The 53 official publications yield the following confirmed aggregate metrics. These figures represent minimum confirmed values, as several publications reference ongoing investigations without final counts.

5. Geographic Distribution Analysis

The documented cases span Libya's three historical regions — Tripolitania, Fezzan, and Cyrenaica — with notable concentration patterns. Southern border regions (Sebha, Ubari, Ghat, Murzuq) show disproportionate representation, consistent with proximity to international borders and the documented cross-border dimensions of the forgery networks.

6. Forgery Typology Classification

Seven distinct forgery methodologies have been identified across the 53 publications:

7. Actor Profiles and Network Structures

The prosecutorial record identifies three primary actor categories operating within the forgery ecosystem: institutional insiders (civil registry employees with database access), technical facilitators (IT specialists and document forgers), and external beneficiaries (foreign nationals and criminal networks seeking fraudulent identities).

The most significant single-actor case involved an IT employee in the Ghadames/Sinawan region who single-handedly created 269 fraudulent national identification numbers through direct database manipulation — demonstrating the vulnerability of centralized digital systems to insider exploitation.

8. Black Market Pricing Structure

Financial dimensions documented across the prosecutorial publications reveal a structured pricing hierarchy for fraudulent identity services:

9. Institutional Exposure Indicators

The documented patterns indicate structural exposure across four critical dimensions: database integrity (centralized systems vulnerable to insider manipulation), electoral integrity (fraudulent registrations affecting voter rolls), fiscal exposure (fraudulent access to state subsidies and public sector employment), and national security (forged documents enabling unverified cross-border movement).

10. Enforcement Progression Model

The prosecutorial record documents five distinct phases of procedural escalation:

11. International Comparative Framework

The scale of documented citizenship fraud in Libya invites comparison with similar challenges in other jurisdictions. Kuwait's "Bidoon" crisis, involving approximately 100,000 stateless individuals, represents the most cited parallel in the Gulf region. Libya's Transparency International Corruption Perceptions Index ranking of 177 out of 180 provides additional institutional context. The FATF framework for identity document security and INTERPOL's database of stolen and lost travel documents offer relevant international standards for evaluating Libya's institutional exposure.

12. The Global Cost: Passport Credibility Assessment

The documented institutional vulnerabilities have measurable consequences for Libya's international standing and the mobility rights of its citizens.

13. Governance and Oversight Gaps

The documented cases reveal structural governance deficiencies including the absence of centralized oversight for civil registry operations, inadequate digital security protocols for identity databases, insufficient inter-agency coordination between civil registry offices, and limited accountability mechanisms for registry employees. These gaps have enabled the systematic exploitation documented throughout this report.

14. Policy Considerations

The following considerations are offered as analytical observations derived from the documented patterns. They represent structural areas where institutional reform may address the identified vulnerabilities:

15. Conclusion

The structured consolidation of 53 official publications documents a pattern of citizenship forgery across multiple jurisdictions. The confirmed quantitative parameters — 3,525+ individuals, 10,620 families, 3,130 forgery incidents, and 282,447 nationality files flagged — indicate structural exposure within Libya's civil registry system that extends beyond isolated criminal acts.

This report is offered as a structured analytical contribution to informed policy discussion. The quantitative parameters are derived exclusively from official sources and are fully traceable.

Appendix A: Summary Case Registry