Farjala's confession, captured on video by Libyan security services, is one of six recorded testimonies that document a direct link between Libya's citizenship forgery crisis and international terrorism. But his story is just one thread in a much larger tapestry — one that involves thousands of forged identities, hundreds of complicit officials, and a black market that has turned Libyan citizenship into a commodity.
An independent analytical consolidation of 53 official publications from Libya's Office of the Attorney General — spanning December 2024 to February 2026 — reveals the full scope of what may be one of the most extensive national identity fraud operations documented in the modern Middle East and North Africa region.
The Numbers That Shook a Nation
The aggregate data extracted from the Attorney General's publications paints a picture of systematic institutional exploitation on a scale that defies isolated criminal explanation. More than 3,525 individuals have been directly referenced in forgery proceedings. An additional 10,620 family records are under active examination. The Attorney General's office has flagged 282,447 nationality files for comprehensive review — a number that represents roughly 4% of Libya's estimated population.
A Geography of Fraud
The forgery cases are not randomly distributed. They cluster along Libya's southern border regions — Sebha, Ubari, Ghat, and Murzuq — where proximity to Chad, Niger, and Algeria creates natural corridors for cross-border identity fraud. But the crisis extends well beyond the periphery. Sirte, in central Libya, produced the single largest case: 598 fraudulent national identification numbers discovered in a single investigation. Tripoli, the capital, has seen cases involving the General Directorate of Civil Registry itself, where a former director was implicated in the creation of 200 fraudulent family records.
Seven Ways to Steal a Country's Identity
The prosecutorial record reveals seven distinct methodologies, ranging from the crude to the sophisticated. At one end, there is simple document theft — blank official forms stolen from registry offices and filled with fraudulent data. At the other, there is direct database manipulation by IT employees with administrative access, capable of creating hundreds of false identities with a few keystrokes. The most alarming case involved a single IT employee in the Ghadames/Sinawan region who created 269 fraudulent national identification numbers through direct database manipulation.
The Price of a Stolen Identity
Like any market, Libya's identity fraud ecosystem has developed a structured pricing hierarchy. A basic name addition to an existing family record — the entry-level service — costs as little as 600 Libyan Dinars (approximately $125). A complete identity package, including national ID and supporting documents, ranges from 5,000 to 10,000 LYD ($1,040–$2,080). At the premium end, a full citizenship package with passport can cost between 30,000 and 70,000 LYD ($6,250–$14,580).
The Terrorism Connection
Perhaps the most alarming dimension of Libya's identity fraud crisis is its documented intersection with international terrorism. Six video confessions obtained by Libyan security services reveal that ISIS-affiliated individuals from Tunisia, Egypt, and Palestine obtained forged Libyan passports to facilitate their operations and international movement.
Karam Mahdi Al-Aswad, a Tunisian ISIS member, revealed that his forged passport was issued through the Libyan Embassy in Turkey — indicating that the institutional penetration extends beyond domestic civil registry offices to diplomatic missions abroad. Khaled Ali Al-Zaabi, another Tunisian ISIS operative, was arrested at Tripoli International Airport while attempting to use a forged Libyan passport for air travel, and named his forger by name: Hamdi Al-Abbasi.
Critical Finding
The documented cases establish that Libya's citizenship forgery infrastructure has functioned as an operational enabler for international terrorism — not merely a bureaucratic failure, but an active security vulnerability exploited by designated terrorist organizations.
The Global Cost: A Passport Destroyed by Forgery
The consequences of systematic identity fraud extend far beyond Libya's borders. On the 2026 Henley Passport Index, Libya ranks 93rd globally — the lowest in all of North Africa. Libyan passport holders can access only 39 destinations without a prior visa, compared to 70 for Morocco, 68 for Tunisia, and 51 for Egypt.
The Schengen visa data tells its own story. Since 2014, Libyan applicants have spent an estimated €13 million on Schengen visa applications, with approximately €2 million lost on rejected applications alone. Spain rejects 65% of Libyan visa applications — the highest rejection rate among Schengen states for Libyan nationals.
In June 2025, the United States issued Presidential Proclamation 10949, suspending entry for all Libyan nationals. The official justification cited, among other factors, the absence of "a competent or cooperative central authority for issuing passports or civil documents in Libya." The data in this investigation confirms that this assessment, while politically consequential, is empirically supported by the documented institutional vulnerabilities.
What Must Change
The path forward requires structural reform at multiple levels. Immediate priorities include biometric verification for all civil registry transactions and comprehensive database security with multi-factor authentication. Medium-term reforms should establish an independent civil registry authority with dedicated oversight mechanisms. Long-term investment in modern digital identity infrastructure — incorporating international standards — is essential for rebuilding both domestic institutional integrity and international credibility.
Critically, civil registry reform is no longer a purely domestic administrative matter. It has become a prerequisite for restoring Libyan citizens' international mobility rights and rebuilding the credibility of Libyan identity documents in the eyes of the international community.
The Bigger Picture
Youssef Farjala paid 1,500 dinars for a Libyan passport. The 7 million Libyans who hold legitimate passports are paying a far higher price — in restricted mobility, in rejected visas, in the slow erosion of their country's international standing. The question is no longer whether Libya has a citizenship forgery problem. The data has answered that definitively. The question is whether the institutional will exists to fix it before the damage becomes irreversible.
About the Author
Omar F. Twati
Independent analyst specializing in governance, institutional integrity, and data-driven policy research. This investigation represents a structured analytical consolidation of publicly released official disclosures and does not constitute institutional representation or governmental affiliation.